CHINA SHOULD PROPOSE A STRATEGY OF JOINING THE TMD

VOA

<Kanwa news 22th March Washington> At the televised 'China Tribune' discussion sponsored by the Voice of America on March 22, the reporter of the KANWA INFORMATION CENTRE, Andrei. Pinkov, indicated that the USA gave the TMD issue a cold treatment through its 'ambiguous policy'. The public, official response from the US government to the TMD is that there is not such a system at this time, not to mention including Taiwan in the TMD defense network. According to Pinkov, even if the TMD is used in the future warfare, the USA will still treat cautiously the issue of whether Taiwan should join the TMD system, based on the consideration of keeping the strength of both Taiwan and the mainland China in balance and maintaining their existing relationship. Therefore, it is inappropriate for China to make such an imprudent response to the TMD issue without a careful analysis.

Pinkov indicated that as China needed to implement its strategy of 'advance deterrence', it was imaginable why China took such a firm, opposing attitude to the issue of Taiwan's joining the TMD, but the reason was far from convincing why China made such a strong response to the joint TMD development by both the USA and Japan. He stressed that at the present period of time, it was not in its interest for China to set itself directly against both the USA and Japan. 'China does not hide its capacities and abide its time when it should, but it does when it should not'. 'The TMD may contain China, but this factor is not an absolute one. Among the three war zones where the TMD is to be set, south Europe and the Middle East do not directly have much to do with China. Even among the four model targets that Japan has set, only one is at the possible missile attack from China, two at North Korea, and another one at Russia'. In addition, Pinkov also made some explanations on the technical details of both the TMD and NMD (i.e. National Missile Defense Program). According to him, the TMD is a system project, which mainly deals with the short- and medium-range ground-to-ground missiles that travel at a velocity of 4.5 kilometers per second within the range of 1000 kilometers. Both the US ground army and navy are now developing the TMD system. The 'Patriot 3' missile of the US ground army and the 'Standard 2 Block 5A' of the US navy both intercept missiles at an altitude of no more than 30,000 meters. As for the high-altitude interceptive systems, the ground army's THAAD and the navy's 'Standard Aegis Leap' both intercept missiles at the altitude of more than 150,000 meters (out of the atmospheric layer). Where is the proof that the TMD has the offensive nature to face those ground-to-ground missiles that possess the absolute offensive characteristics?

With regard to the NMD, Pinkov emphasized its major differences from the TMD. First of all, as the arena where a warfare starts is in the US territory, it is required to intercept the quasi-intercontinental ballistic missiles or the intercontinental ballistic missiles that travel at more than five to seven kilometers per second, as well as the land-based phased array radar that is more precise and has a better capability of long-range detection.

According to Pinkov, the smart thing China should do is to propose at a strategic decision level, its participation in the US TMD program. Though there is very low possibility that this proposal will be accepted by the USA, yet from the policy point of view, it will make the latter lose the excuse of implementing the TMD warfare against China in the Far East region. In the meantime, it will also challenge the current US policy of banning the transfer of both the advanced technology and the military technology to China ( Kanwa news) .