By Yihong ZhangThe "extraordinary" gesture made by Jiang Zemin as he bowed only to the Chinese flag while reviewing the Japanese guards of honor after his arrival in Japan on November 26 was tantamount to an indication to the outside world that his visit to Japan was the least diplomatic activity he wished to undertake as a head of state.
The Chinese diplomatic source indicates to the KWIC reporter that as far as the personal sentiment is concerned, Jiang Zemin doesn't have a favorable impression of Japan. On several different occasions, Jiang said that the songs he had sung most in his youth were the anti-Japanese songs. The source of the Japanese Asahisinbun believes, too, that Jiang Zemin has too strong a personal consciousness of "little Japan". At the welcoming banquet hosted by Emperor Akihito in his honor, Jiang Zemin departed from his normal behavior. He wore a Chinese tunic suit and his facial expression always remained solemn. All these indications were sufficient to show that to a certain degree, he did hope to express his consciousness of "big China" and to give prominence to the sense of cultural superiority China has gained over Japan.
As far as the diplomatic significance was concerned, however, Jiang Zemin's visit was really not a success. In terms of the official state visits, the biggest difference between Jiang Zemin's visit to Japan and the twice-held Sino-US summit meetings was that the former didn't end us with the signing of the "Joint Declaration" by the two heads of state and that there was even no joint news conference.
The reason why Jiang Zemin was not willing to sign the "Joint Declaration", as the official of the Japanese Foreign Ministry later indicated, was that the two countries had not expected at all that the "Joint Declaration" would necessarily need to be signed. Obviously, the two countries had such a deep understanding of each other because of the similar languages and common ancestry. Prior to the summit meeting, they both had taken an attitude of fathoming each other's intention and acting according to the circumstances. The "Joint Declaration" could have been signed only if the two countries had been both satisfied with it. Now that neither of the heads of state finally signed the "Joint Declaration", it meant that China was not satisfied with the final wording in the "Joint Declaration". The question is what specifically China was not satisfied with.
First of all, on the issue of Taiwan, Japan expressed earlier its position of not putting the "Three NOs" in writing. Considering the too big a difference between these two countries on this issue, the Japanese Foreign Ministry informed China in early November that it was better not to hold a joint news conference. Now that Jiang Zemin made his visit to Japan, it would naturally mean that he entertained no hopes for a breakthrough on this issue and that he generally agreed to accept this arrangement. Therefore, China expected that the "Three NOs" would not be included in the "Joint Declaration".
However, the crux of the matter was how the war issues were addressed in the "Joint Declaration". Finally, Japan didn't use the word "apology", but only "deep introspection" instead. Before this summit meeting was held, the Asahisimbun had quoted the official source of saying that Japan would apologize in the similar declaration for what it had done during the war. Evidently, among the Japanese officials, there were some in favor of apology. China was sure about this and it hoped at least not to lose face in front of the South Koreans. For the Japanese who are always particular about hierarchy, they still need to distinguish the apology issues on the basis of the magnitude of damage and the differences in time and to "self-examine these issues by degrees". This is what the Chinese leader and people would not accept. However, the final result disappointed China.
On the issue of Taiwan, Japan didn't even publicly make the oral promise of the "Three NOs" as did President Clinton, not even that of two of the "Three NOs". This upset China.
For such an important official summit meeting, why weren't there any frank communications that took place beforehand? There were so many obstacles that the publication of the "Joint Declaration" was delayed for six hours. Among all the Chinese foreign ministers in history, only Tang Jiaxuan is a Japan hand and is familiar with the Japanese language. He once worked as a minister at the Chinese Embassy in Japan. However, the more dissatisfied China is with the way the Japan affairs are dealt with, the more pressure he will face in the future. Inside the Chinese Foreign Ministry, those who are in favor of the USA and the European countries and those who are pro-Russian may take advantage of this handle in order to gain more say in the foreign policy. It is reported that after Qian Qichen left his office, there was a wide rumor that Liu Huaqiu, the Director of the State Council's Foreign Affairs Office, who is familiar with the US affairs, would succeed Qian as the candidate for the post of the foreign minister.
In addition, Jiang Zemin didn't sign the "Joint Declaration" out of another intention. It was that he didn't hope to hold the personal responsibility for the way the war issues were addressed in the "Joint Declaration". It is evident that after his visit, both China and Japan will bring more suspicions and distrust into the 21st century (Yihong Zhang).
