By Andrei PinkovIt seemed to be in the extreme absence of the "favorable atmosphere" that Jiang Zemin made his first state visit to Japan. This absence of the "favorable atmosphere" is evidenced by the ever increasing differences between China and Japan in the strategic security and the issue of Taiwan. These differences have, in turn, affected the economic cooperation between these two countries. At the end of the meeting, the heads of the two states didn't sign the "Joint declaration". In the same declaration, Japan did not apologize for the war issue in such a way as China had expected. Obviously, the result of the summit meeting was really limited.
On the security issue, while the problem of whether the "Japan-US Guideline" covers Taiwan remains pending. Japan made the hasty decisions this month to launch four spy satellites by the year of 2002 and to raise up to the technical level from next year the ballistic missile defence initiative on which Japan has made a joint "research" with the USA. These decisions have further provoked China.
With such a background as mentioned above, both China and Japan realized the importance of cooling down the heat inherent in the summit meeting. Jiang Zemin visited both Russia and Japan at one go with the former as the first country to visit. In fact, this was an extremely "indirect" visit route. It only reflected the order of importance that the Chinese foreign policy places. Meanwhile, President Kim Dae Jong of South Korea visited Beijing before Jiang Zemin began his visit. Prior to his visit to Beijing, Kim Dae Jong visited Japan at the invitation of the Japanese Government. The manner and contents of the apology Japan had made to South Korea for the war issue were better than those of the apology Japan later made to China. Obviously, Japan showed enough respect for South Korea. It is easy to see the position of South Korea in the diplomatic struggle between China and Japan for the regional domination. Of course, Japan does not ignore Russia. Before Jiang Zemin's visit to Russia, the Japanese prime minister visited Moscow on November 11. The intention of Japan was not to leave any room for China to play the "Russian game" in its Japan policy. Only the timing and the order of the countries visited are sufficient to demonstrate that both China and Japan are trying to gain the diplomatic initiative for the regional domination through both the open strife and veiled struggle.
Why has Japan lately become so stiff on its China policy? Obviously, In its China policy, Japan has placed more and more importance to the role of the economic game it plays with China. As early as this March, Japan's Research Institute for Peace and Security Protection was entrusted by the Japanese Defence Ministry to publish a report entitled "the Comprehensive Survey and Analysis of the Security Protection Environment in the Asian/Pacific Area". This report especially pointed out the role of the economic game played by Japan and believed that China had taken a more "restraining" attitude toward its criticism of the "Japan-US Guideline". The analysis revealed that this situation partially resulted from Japan's resumption of free economic aid to China. After China ceased its nuclear testing, it came to realize the importance of the Japanese economic aid in maintaining its political regime and in developing its economy.
Such an understanding indicates that Japan really hopes to say more "NOs" to the Chinese diplomatic and political requests by means of its "economic game". Just as expected, before Jiang Zemin's visit, Japan went to the length of declaring that from next year, the fourth loan that Japan makes to China will be reduced by 10 per cent per year on the average.
Why does Japan take a more ambiguous attitude toward the "ownership of Taiwan" than does the USA? This is because for the Japanese Foreign Ministry, this position should be considered in conjunction with the general definition of the Taiwan Strait as included in the "Japan-US Guideline". This paves the way for the possible Japanese involvement in the future "development of the situation" if need be and avoids the accusation from China that Japan "interferes in the Chinese domestic affairs". For the USA, however, despite the three joint communiqués, there exists the Bill on the US Relationship with Taiwan which ensures the US commitment to Taiwan. For the historical reasons and in consideration of its international status and actual strength, Japan, of course, can not work out such an open act. Instead, all it can do is only to ingeniously convert some of the articles in the "Japan-US Guideline" into the Japanese version of the "Bill on the Japanese Relationship with Taiwan".
